

**00900**

**1962/10/30**

2115  
DRAFT:

ACTION: USUN, NEW YORK

SUBJECT: UN Inspection Procedures

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 10/30/82

REVIEWED by JL

DATE 4-6-88

( ) RELEASE ( ) DECLASSIFY  
( ) EXCISE ( ) DECLASSIFY IN PART  
( ) DENY ( ) NON-RESPONSIVE INFO.  
FOIA/EO 1.28 Exemptions (b)(3)

You are requested to convey to Thant following suggestions regarding UN inspection procedures during and after dismantling and withdrawal period which have been developed here in light views expressed by Kuznetsov to SYG (UrTel 1535).

From our viewpoint, ideally inspection would begin immediately upon return of Thant and cover (1) incoming cargoes; (2) outgoing cargoes; (3) dismantling process at missile bases; (4) verification after withdrawal process allegedly completed in order assure there has been full compliance with agreement. Suggested inspection programs for dealing with each of these phases follows:

(1) Incoming Cargoes. As indicated Deptel 1136, we prepared accept ICRC inspection incoming cargoes on ships from bloc ports. According our projection \_\_\_ ships now in transit or scheduled depart bloc ports shortly to arrive in Cuba during next three to four weeks \_\_\_ number Red Cross inspectors required to do job will depend on whether inspection at sea or onshore. Most efficient use manpower would be port inspection permitting close, seriatim inspection vessels without transit time required shuttling between vessels at sea. Accordingly, hope port inspection agreeable to Cubans. We strongly prefer port inspection to inspection high seas. If inspection done at ports, we estimate \_\_\_ personnel needed. If done on high seas, estimate \_\_\_ would be required. Date: 7/3/92

Deft

(X) RELEASE (X) DECLASSIFY  
( ) EXCISE ( ) DECLASSIFY  
( ) DENY IN PART  
( ) DELETE Non-Responsive Info  
FOIA Exemptions  
PA Exemptions

EO 1.28 Only:  
EO 1.28

Authority to  
( ) OADR/EF as ( ) S or ( ) C OADR  
( ) DOWNGRADE TS to ( ) S or ( ) C OADR

/We believe

We believe inspection of incoming cargoes should continue until entire verification process completed, thus giving us assurance all offensive weapons and related facilities withdrawn or dismantled.

2. Outgoing Cargoes. If ICRC port inspection acceptable, same team could check outbound shipments from Cuba. To be meaningful, such inspection would be against prior inventory of weapons being shipped (in general categories not raising too many security problems for the Soviets) to be supplied by Soviets to ICRC. Such inventory obviously dependent on Soviet willingness and good faith. We recognize their agreement unlikely, but believe suggestions worth discussing. (If Soviets declare less equipment in proscribed category than we know they have this good grounds for suspicion about their compliance and if they declare more materiel in Cuba than we currently know about, we gain further advantage <sup>re factual</sup> ~~taxfreakfai~~ situation.)

Our estimate is that team of \_\_\_\_ ICRC personnel would be required for checking outgoing cargoes, in addition to those inspecting incoming cargo ships. This phase of work could be completed in two or three weeks if enough Soviet bloc shipping is available.

3. Aerial Reconnaissance. As indicated in DEPTTEL 1136, we believe some continuing aerial reconnaissance essential, particularly if no on-site inspection of missile sites can be arranged until dismantling completed. Our strong preference is for UN to do job. Canadians have volunteered pilots to UN. You have already indicated to SYG and Rikhye our

and Rikhye our willingness to make available four RF-101's.

We could make available C-130's and within two-week/<sup>period</sup>train aircrews from one of the following: Mexico, Argentina, Chile or Columbia. Canada and Indonesia already have competent crews which would take only brief period to check them out.

Another highly attractive possibility would be for Mexico or Argentina to volunteer squadron of T-11's and crews which Defense Department believes would be fully capable to do kind of surveillance job we want. Moreover, it is quite feasible to secure suitable cameras from other nations. Processing unit with U.S. equipment could be readily provided to operate in Havana or at whatever place U.N. would wish to use as base of operations.

You should therefore reaffirm all this to SYG, strongly urging him to develop a UN reconnaissance capability that would enable us to withhold our own flights. We recognize that (unlike US) UN will only wish to overfly Cuba after explicit clearance by Cuban authorities. US would of course need access to photos resulting from UN reconnaissance. It goes without saying that US aerial surveillance will continue throughout entire dismantling and withdrawal operation as long as there is no adequate substitute to satisfy us that agreement is in fact being carried out.

4. Verification of Compliance with Agreement on Assumption  
No On-Site Inspection Permitted.

Judging from Kuznetsov's remarks yesterday (URTEL 1535), Soviets will not agree to UN verification until dismantling of missile

sites

[REDACTED]

sites has taken place. If this assumption correct, it becomes doubly important that UN perform verification function in manner which will satisfy us that Communists have in fact abided by commitment dismantle missile sites and withdraw offensive weapons. Verification problem breaks down into following aspects: (a) terms of reference UN team; (b) number of observers; and (c) composition.

(a) Terms of Reference: UN/Cuba

Preferably UN would be invited inspect actual dismantling of missile sites. At minimum, UN should inspect on spot those sites after dismantling which identified by US as missile bases as well as any Cuban airport which could accommodate bombers and any other area where we have reason believe there may have been concealment of such weapons.

Such teams

[REDACTED]

Such teams should have unrestricted confidential communication facilities with their headquarters units, and free access to areas required for the performance of their duties. US will furnish to UN comprehensive list of locations to be covered under foregoing. Items under ~~XXXXXX~~ current agreement contained in Deptel 1126.

(b) Number of Inspectors

The number of inspectors required to do job satisfactorily will depend on length of time permitted to accomplish task and on the extent of mobility. US would prefer to see such verification accomplished quickly. Assuming for political reasons Communists would prefer keep number UN inspectors relatively small, suggest UN consider possibility utilizing number of helicopters or small planes (which US prepared make available) to permit rapid transit inspection teams maximum number sites in minimum time. It appears to us that team of 50-60 men with adequate air transport could accomplish verification job within a week or so. Moreover, we would want UN aerial observation as described in section 3 this paper to participate in verification process.

(c) Composition

While we assume that probably only citizens of neutral countries will be acceptable to Communists for verification personnel on the ground, it is important from our standpoint that "neutral countries" defined be ~~XXXXXX~~ for this purpose of genuinely reliable members who have demonstrated impartiality during crisis. For example, we would prefer to exclude UAR and Ghana citizens in light of "unneutral" statements made by their Dels in SC meeting and would be willing to see some LA's included such as Brazil and Mexico (recognizing Cuba unlikely agree

to latter's

[REDACTED]

to latter's inclusion). From neutrals, we would prefer nations from Sweden, Switzerland, Nigeria, India and Ireland. When it comes to air reconnaissance, it is probably not so important to have neutral personnel; Canadians and ~~the~~ Argentines, for example, might prove acceptable.

## 5. Security Council Action.

(a) We greatly prefer that any of foregoing inspection arrangements be carried out as executive operation under SYG. As indicated Deptel 1136, we hope ICRC will operate as executive agent of SYG. We understand ICRC operated in similar capacity at UN request in checking compliance with Geneva agreement in US POW camps in Korea. Also, ICRC has acted as executive agent for High Commissioner for Refugees in Congo.

(b) UN/Cuba should be sanctioned by SC and operate under SYG. It would be established at time Soviets report to SC that they have completed dismantling and withdrawal.

(c) We believe financing all verification measures should come under \$2,000,000 provision in regular UN budget for small-scale peace and security operations. If total cost likely to exceed one million dollars, financing problem will need to be reviewed in the ~~right~~ light of the then U.S. position on financing UN peace-and-security operations.

## 6. Longer-Range Inspection Problem.

Best approach to ensuring against recurrence of problem posed by Soviets in stationing nuclear weapons in Western Hemisphere lies, we believe, in moving forward along lines of Brazilian Resolution on

Latin-American nuclear-free zone. Such a zone established as self-denying ordinance agreed among Latin American countries including Cuba, could use UN SYG as executive agent to conduct periodic inspections to assure all members of zone that all other members were living up to agreement.